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INTRODUCTION
Around the laws that regulate information and communication
swarm a host of related nonlegal norms: norms of secrecy,
confidentiality, and privacy; of anonymity, source-identity, and
citation; of quotation, paraphrase, and hyperbole; norms of free
copying and norms of obtaining permission; norms of gossip and of
blackmail. The articles by Saul Levmore
1 and Richard McAdams2
provide useful windows on some of the ways these laws and norms
interact. The two articles also provide insight into the comparative
advantage possessed in some circumstances by law and by nonlegal
norms, respectively, when information and communication are at
issue. In my brief Comment I will discuss these two articles, and
some relevant issues of commensurability and commodification.
Levmore's concern is with one particular set of tools: anonym-
ity, source-disclosure, and intermediation. These tools appear in
both legal and social settings, and are governed by different norms
in each. Levmore tracks their variants and examines how deploy-
ment of these tools can assist in the enforcement of yet other norms
(as, for example, anonymous teacher evaluations are administered
in the hope of encouraging professors to adhere to norms of high
teaching quality).' McAdams's article also examines group norms.
It focuses on how the enforcement, articulation, and reformation of
group norms can be affected by laws that criminalize blackmail.
McAdams's overall concern is to examine what attitudes our law
generally evidences toward group norms.
Most of the Symposium's participants refer to the enforcers of
nonlegal norms as the "village gossips." Calling something a village
is roughly equivalent to identifying it as a community characterized
t Professor of Law and PaulJ. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University School
of Law. Copyright © 1996 by WendyJ. Gordon. Thanks are owed to Sam Postbrief,
my in-house sociology expert and polymath. I also extend thanks to Richard
McAdams, from whom I have learned much despite our continuing disagreement on
the issues, and to Eric Blumensen, Bob Bone, and Rob Greenberg.
'See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2191 (1996).
2 See Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2237 (1996).
' See Levmore, supra note 1, at 2203-06.
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by repeated interaction, shared information, availability of mutual
sanction, and like considerations. If one dispenses with any
requirement of geographical propinquity, the writers and readers of
this Symposium are members of one such "village." One of the
norms that determines our behavior is the unspoken consensus on
what kinds of questions belong on the academic agenda. And until
recently, nonlegal norms remained outside of most lawyers'
scholarship.
Our growing inquiry into norms may betoken a new egalitarian-
ism and openness to concerns of noncentralized authority, and
certainly has called forth much intriguing scholarship, such as the
contributions by Professors Levmore and McAdams discussed below.
Yet our usual methodologies might require significant adaptation if
they are to succeed in this new arena. Levmore's article is concep-
tually straightforward and will teach any reader a great deal;
McAdams's article-though it contains as many wonderful nuggets
as does Levmore's-is in the end unpersuasive, because of its
intricate attempts to construct an exhaustive analysis upon a largely
speculative base.
I. LEVMORE ON ANONYMITY
Levmore's article discusses the norms governing anonymity, and
how these norms mediate between sometimes conflicting societal
goals. The goals Levmore has in mind are primarily the following:
increasing the quantity of information; increasing the reliability, and
thereby improving the quality, of information; and protecting the
feelings of, and the relationships among, a speaker, a recipient of
information, and third parties. One of Levmore's themes is the
potential to improve the yields, on all these very different scales, by
combining anonymity with the use of an intermediary-such as a
publisher who distributes a pseudonymous novel or a policeman to
whom an informant desiring anonymity supplies a tip. The
intermediary keeps the name secret, but acts as a filter to provide
the audience some assurances about the quality of the information
supplied.
Levmore further examines whether the set of social anonymity
norms4 has anything to teach lawmakers about how to structure
4 I use "anonymity norms" as shorthand to embrace both norms that recommend
anonymity and norms that recommend its alternatives, such as full disclosure and
intermediation.
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anonymity rules within the law itself. In particular, he discusses the
current rule that allows individual jurors to be polled. This rule
aims at discouraging corruption by eliminating the possibility that
a juror may keep her vote anonymous. This practice of post-trial
jury polling, however, has a danger; in order to avoid adverse
comments from friends and community members once the trial is
over, some jurors may vote contrary to their actual but unpopular
convictions. Levmore admits that this harm, potentially resulting
from disclosure of juror names and votes, may be less damaging to
the polity than the kind of corruption that jury anonymity might
invite. But Levmore suggests that any such bipolar choice between
full disclosure and anonymity is unnecessarily restrictive.
It is at least conceptually possible, he points out, for the judge
to act as an intermediary. Under such a revised practice, individual
juror votes could be disclosed to the judge; the judge could then be
given the discretion'to disclose which juror cast which vote, but only
upon a showing that evidence of jury tampering existed and
warranted investigation.
But this intermediary solution is not used in the jury-polling
context. One of Levmore's descriptive contentions is that the law
uses intermediaries less often and less effectively than do social
actors. Sometimes, as he points out, the intermediary solution is
simply not physically available,5 but often there is no clear reason
why the legal system is reluctant to embrace the intermediary route.
Part of the puzzle Levmore poses to the reader-and leaves for
further research-is why the law might prefer a bipolar approach
between anonymity and full disclosure.
Levmore is also concerned with the limits and abuses of the
intermediary's role. Much more, however, could be done on that
tack. For example, consider the very question Levmore poses, as to
why the law supposedly does not use intermediaries as much as
social actors do. One answer might be that legal intermediaries
have power and privileges that largely immunize them from scrutiny.
Consider, for example, how long it took for police brutality to
become an available and corfimon form of lawsuit, and how many
tort privileges still remain attached to governmental actors. By
contrast, social intermediaries are individually chosen, case-by-case,
by the participants themselves, so that only those meriting trust will
be likely to receive it, and any abuses will be societally rebuked.
-'See Levmore, supra note 1, at 2216-18.
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Thus, it may be the question of "who watches the watchers"-the
need for some entity to restrain and discipline the intermediaries-
that militates against the law using intermediaries more often.
Levmore hints at this,6 but the potential for abuse by intermediaries
warrants more discussion.
In addition, the reader may not be persuaded by Levmore's
descriptive claim that the law is much more reluctant to use
intermediaries than are social actors, and that the law is bound to
binary choices, in particular, the yes/no of either full disclosure or
anonymity. In fact, the law often uses intermediaries.
For example, the grand jury, with its sharp confidentiality
restrictions, can be seen as exactly the kind of intermediary
Levmore has in mind: all sorts of unsorted evidence are brought to
the intermediary (the grand jury) to be sifted and evaluated; if the
intermediary finds the evidence sufficiently persuasive, it issues an
indictment. The indictment does not name all the evidence pre-
senters-that is, it preserves their anonymity-but makes use of the
information they present, precisely as social intermediaries often
do.
7
Levmore himself gives other examples where the law does use
intermediaries, but ordinarily dismisses them as the exception that
proves the rule.' Many readers will see them instead as tending to
refute the rule. Thus, a reader might come away from the article
doubting Levmore's description of the law as predominantly
confined to a binary choice between anonymity and full disclosure.
Nevertheless, those same readers will have been delighted by
Levmore's exploration of complex territory, and intrigued by his
implicit suggestion that the current rules on post-trial jury polling
could be improved by the use of the judge as an intermediary.
One of the many virtues of Levmore's article is the maturity of
his style.9 Just as economics becomes more realistic as it ventures
6 See, e.g., id. at 2231 (noting that with government intermediaries, "there is always
the question of entrapment").
' In fact, the law here is so eager to provide an intermediary that it sometimes
ignores the damage that the intermediation can do: because grand jury proceedings
are secret, a person called to testify has no way to prove to her (perhaps) well-armed
criminal associates that she did not inform on them.
' Levmore mentions the grand jury's use of jury-poll anonymity, see Levmore,
supra note 1, at 2217 n.42, but not that institution's role as an intermediary.
' Given that our topic is communication norms, it should be noted that one thing
that makes ideas and information circulate is enjoyment. To quote Jim Lindgren,
"Style matters." James Lindgren, Style Matters: A Review Essay on Legal Writing, 92
YALE L.J. 161 (1982) (book review). In a law review article, enjoyment requires clear
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out into societally softer territory like that of norms,"0 Levrmore's
article has a wonderfully novelistic quality as it explores the nuances
of behavior. It is a risk-taking article, and a successful one. It is
also usefully self-critical.
For example, although Levmore might suggest that efficiency is
arguably consistent with a given observed practice, he is clearly
open to the possibility that the same claim of arguable efficiency
might be made even if the opposite practice were dominant." His
tone cautions us to avoid the dangers of post hoc propter hoc, a far cry
from the casual dealing with factual assumptions that characterized
early law and economics claims for the efficiency of various legal
rules. Perhaps we are moving into an era of data gathering, of
specificity, of which Ronald Coase would finally approve.
12
Thus, Levmore's article is useful not simply because of its
content. Here we have a past master of traditional analytic law and
economics venturing into HenryJames territory-which is where we
all really live."3 That is an invitation to creativity and to observation
of actual practice that many of us should be willing to engage.
presentation, lively examples, and thought-provoking slants on issues previously taken
for granted. In all these things, Levmore (as usual) excels.
10 "An Indian-born economist once explained his personal theory of reincarnation
to his graduate economics class. 'If you are a good economist, a virtuous economist,'
he said, 'you are reborn as a physicist. But if you are an evil, wicked economist, you
are reborn as a sociologist.'" PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY: ECONOMIC
SENSE AND NONSENSE IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS at xi (1994).
The meaning of thejoke depends on the audience. For most lawyer/economists,
the punchline depends on an assumed superiority of hard physics over soft social
science. But Krugman argues that the Indian economist was "talking about
something else entirely: the sheer difficulty of the subject. Economics is harder than
physics; luckily it is not quite as hard as sociology." Id.
1 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 1, at 2223-24.
12 A primary burden of Coase's work has been to stress the importance of
transaction costs and other data that can be determined only by observation. For an
example, see R.H. COASE, The Lighthouse in Economics, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND
THE LAW 187 (1988), where Professor Coase examines whether a classic economic
assumption-that lighthouse services need to be provided by government-is consistent
with the available facts. Professor Coase writes:
I think we should try to develop generalizations which would give us
guidance as to how various activities should best be organized and financed.
But such generalizations are not likely to be helpful unless they are derived
from studies of how such activities are actually carried out within different
institutional frameworks.
Id. at 211.
" For an exploration that contrasts the novelistic and utilitarian imaginations, see
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETICJUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE
(1995).
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II. MCADAMS ON THE DISCLOSURE AND DISCUSSION OF
INFORMATION REGARDING NORM VIOLATION
The primary concern of Richard McAdams's accomplished
article is how law affects "the conditions under which members of
close-knit groups can threaten to invoke certain norm sanctions,
such as shame and reputational loss."14 Given the current debates
about liberalism and its goal of maintaining political neutrality
among competing conceptions of the good, McAdams is right on
the money in choosing to examine the impact of law on group
norms in general-for such norms constitute, almost by definition,
competing conceptions of the good. 5
Seen through the lens of liberalism, the torts of defamation
and "false light" privacy can be seen as fairly sharp-edged tools
for helping communities maintain accuracy of information about
their members' norm compliance. 16  McAdams's chosen turf,
however, is blackmail law,' 7 the impact of which on primary group
norms'8 is much more controversial.
14 McAdams, supra note 2, at 2291.
's This Comment will shortly turn to issues of commensurability. On the
relationship between liberalism and commensurability, see, for example, infra note
55 and accompanying text.
16 The liberalism inquiry leads to several interesting ways to recast classic doctrinal
issues within this branch of tort law. For example, courts differ on what descriptions
or attributions are "defamatory" and thus actionable; to treat one description as
actionable and to deny action for another is to distinguish between conceptions of the
good. One conception is being respected, and one is being treated as trivial.
17 Criminalizing blackmail means that the law forbids certain market transfers of
information, yet permits free exchange (disclosure) of the information. Using
Professor Radin's terms, blackmail criminalization makes embarrassing information
partly "market-inalienable" insofar as the law restricts its sale but allows the
information to be given away. See MargaretJ. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1853 (1987). The market-inalienability is "partial" because although the
law prohibits its sale to the person who wants the information to be kept silent, an
information-holder is permitted to sell the information to other parties-notably,
those who are unlikely to keep it secret, such as tabloid news media and the police.
Laws that forbid sale but permit gifts and other nonmarket transfers have long
been a topic of scholarship. The legal academy's investigation of the laws that
criminalize blackmail (sale of information), prostitution (sale of sex), and other
inalienabilities took on a distinctly economic bent with the publication of Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972); for later explorations, see,
for example, GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrrT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); Radin,
supra; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theowy of Properly Rights, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 931 (1985).
" To outline his argument, three categories of norms should be identified:
primary norms of ordinary behavior (such as "do not cheat on tests" or "do not use
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McAdams focuses on the impact that blackmail laws. have on the
cost of gossip-in particular, whether the lawful availability of
blackmail revenue would decrease the now fairly free exchange of
information ("gossip") about norm violation. He also examines
whether norm internalization and norm critique and refinement-all
of which may require public disclosures-are better served by
blackmail's criminalization or by legalization. He argues that
criminalization best serves groups' interests in encouraging
disclosure and facilitating the internalization and reformation of
primary norms. 9 Conversely, McAdams suggests that the availabil-
ity of lawful blackmail would inhibit disclosure of norm violations,
on the ground that the promise of earning money through black-
mail would work to dissuade the ordinary group member from
freely disseminating any injurious information he happened to
possess.
McAdams's primary concern is whether the dynamics of
behavior will lead toward, or away from, efficiency. In particular,
he is interested in evaluating how outlawing blackmail-either
commercial blackmail, which involves research into the victims'
pasts or their peccadilloes, or opportunistic blackmail, which
involves use of adventitiously acquired information-will affect
efficient and inefficient small-group norms.
20
Preliminarily, let me suggest that the usage of "efficiency"
notions here is a bit strained.21 Efficiency ordinarily means the
maximization of monetary value of goods or services, and policy-
more than your share of the common pasture"), norms of blackmail behavior (such
as "do not blackmail" or perhaps "blackmailing is acceptable"), and norms of
disclosure and nondisclosure (gossip versus privacy). (Note that McAdams does not
discuss most of the variants on disclosure explored by Levmore.)
" He makes the argument that criminalization best serves the goals ofintcrnaliza-
tion and reformation of primary group norms in part because privacy norms correct
for the tendency toward overdisclosure ("gossip" again) which le sees otherwise
resulting from the blackmail prohibition.
20 McAdams argues that blackmail's effect on the expected cost of norm violations
is "ambiguous," but that criminalizing blackmail aids in the internalization and
refinement of norms. See infra text following note 30.
2" Professor Radin would probably classify this McAdams article as exhibiting an
urge toward "universal commodification," because it seems to assume that "market
theory itself, using a market failure analysis, can determine when things should not
be bought and sold." Radin, supra note 17, at 1859. Professor McAdams undoubt-
edly would not want his analysis pressed so far as to evaluate everything in fungible
efficiency terms; as Professor Radin herself notes, "[u]niversal commodification is an
archetype, a caricature" that even economic analysts do not fully embrace. Id. at
1862.
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makers who consider economics a useful criterion of social welfare
usually do so because monetary value provides an objective measure
(albeit highly inexact) of utility. Efficiency makes a great deal of
sense as a criterion for judging commercial norms (for example,
among diamond merchants22) or norms of land use (for example,
among ranchers and farmers in Shasta County23 ). Its usefulness,
however, diminishes sharply when moving to norms governing less
quantifiable behavior, in particular, behavior that we ordinarily
judge less by its ability to produce satisfaction ("utility"24 ) than by its
moral status.25  Not all of us are Benthamites who believe that
moral norms are simply codes through which utility expresses itself.
As Cass Sunstein points out, some norms have to do with the
kind of persons we want to become and the kinds of preferences we
want to have. 2' A norm can be desired, respected, and valued by
virtually all members of a community even if the norm fails to
maximize either.monetary value or emotions of utility satisfaction.
It is possible that McAdams's analysis could apply to norms that
have nothing to do with utility or money. That is, if his analysis
were internally powerful, it might tell us something useful about
disclosure of norm violations, internalization of norms, and
refinement of norms, even tf those norms were desired for reasons
other than efficiency. But is his analysis persuasive? In some
aspects, yes, particularly in regard to some of the connections he
explores between blackmail law and privacy norms.27 Nevertheless,
key segments falter precisely because he fails to note that some
norms can trump both money and utility.
' See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industy, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
2 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 15-120 (1991).
24 "Utility" is the criterion often employed by those ethicists who view all values
as commensurable. For discussions highlighting some intriguing issues of com-
mensurability, see, for example, MargaretJ. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability,
43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Radin, supra note 17; Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and
Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994).
25 Cf. infra note 48 (discussing the distinction between Cemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft).
26 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2029-33 (1996) (noting that the community may embrace norms that encourage
desired preferences).
" The connection with privacy norms is explored in Part II of McAdams's article.
See McAdams, supra note 2, at 2266-91. My critique focuses primarily on Part I of
that article.
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McAdams's analysis depends in significant part on predictions
he makes about which norms will evolve for or against committing
blackmail. Yet he skims over the concept of "honor,"28 itself a
norm, which will keep many people from considering as possible
revenue the money they could reap from committing blackmail.
Rather, he makes a large assumption: that legalizing blackmail will
have only one large effect on norms, and that will be toward making
blackmail a more socially acceptable activity. He realizes blackmail
is currently considered unsavory, but his argument suggests that if
blackmail were legalized, the number of people engaged in it would
increase sharply. Apparently it would become no more a subject of
social opprobrium than hard bargaining or being a slumlord. He
assumes-and this is key-that all people will routinely include in
their utility calculations the likely payoff from committing black-
mail.
29
The latter is the concealed centerpiece of much of his analysis:
that after the legalization of blackmail, everyone-not just the bad
apples who might go into the business of commercial blackmail-will
be willing to blackmail if the price is right."0 Gossip, the free
exchange of information within groups, will decrease, and persons
who accidentally acquire evidence of norm violation will have an
incentive to keep the evidence concealed. If this happens,
McAdams argues, there will be two categories of effect.
(1) Members of groups will increasingly engage in blackmail
rather than disclose instances of norm violation, which will (a)
have an indeterminate effect on the cost of norm violation and
more definitely (b) reduce the visibility of norm violations and
thus reduce opportunities for public education and norm
internalization; and
(2) group members will decrease their involvement in criticizing
and refining norms, since narrowing the group's norms might
deprive group members of potential blackmail revenues.
Are these outcomes likely?
The strongest effect of legalizing blackmail will be the creation
of commercial blackmail firms, like Richard Epstein's hypothesized
2 McAdams does, however, suggest interestingly that honor is often eroded by
rationalization. See id. at 2262 n.72.
2 See id. at 2246, 2260, 2283-84.
30 Of course, McAdams does not contend that everyone will blackmail; at any
given "reward" for blackmailing, only those at the margin will be affected.
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Blackmail, Inc.,31 whose business will be digging up dirt. The
existence of commercial blackmailers-the slumlords of informa-
tion-could mean that everyone with money would be subjected to
the garbage-sorting scrutiny that today only celebrities must bear.
If blackmail were legal, many disclosures of norm violation
would result as fallout from the blackmail business-such as
accidental disclosures, disclosures made to establish "credibility,"3
2
and disclosures made when blackmail payments are not offered in
satisfactory amounts. My guess"8 is that the disclosure-increasing
impact of allowing commercial blackmail will outweigh the disclo-
sure-decreasing impact of allowing opportunistic blackmail.
If so, legalizing blackmail will increase the likelihood of norm
violations being disclosed and punished by social opprobrium, with
the consequent educational and internalization effects. Thus, the
net effect of allowing commercial blackmail is likely to be an increase
in the very effects McAdams thinks legalization would inhibit. 4
If we turn our attention from commercial to opportunistic
blackmail, we first note that possessors of casual information are
more likely to be friends than strangers. 5 Thus, its practitioners
are more likely to be group members in good standing rather than
staffers of Blackmail, Inc. If so, are ordinary group members really
likely to take the possible profits from blackmail into account?
McAdams himself notes that norms tend to be weakest when the
violators are acting on "victims outside their social groups."3
6
Speaking as a matter of observation, most people do not engage in
" See Richard A. Epstein, Blackmai4 Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1983).
52 Commentators have long argued that blackmailers will need to disclose
occasionally, in order to demonstrate the sincerity of their threats. See e.g., Wendy
J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1741, 1751 (1993) (describing such a motivation as an "affirmative and
independent motive[] to disclose").
" Note my use of the word "guess." Neither McAdams nor I am predicting; real
prediction requires an extensive knowledge base. We are engaging in conjecture, and
there is a risk that the very elaborateness of McAdams's analysis may lend it a
seeming reliability that even he would not claim.
" In my view, allowing commercial blackmail would also lead to an increase in the
cost of norm violation. McAdams is agnostic on whether legalization will increase the
cost of violating norms.
" Admittedly, strangers such as hotel clerks and credit-card staff also have access
to a great deal of information about each of us, but employer confidentiality codes
restrain credit-card account clerks and the like. Thus, independent of blackmail bans
these businesspeople have an incentive to keep the information private: their desire
to keep their jobs, and our custom.
' McAdams, supra note 2, at 2245 n.24 (discussing property crimes).
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hard bargaining within their own social set over noncommercial
matters even where such behavior is lawful. This observation hardly
suggests that a significant increase in intragroup blackmail will
follow from legalization. Nor are people who play status-games
through disclosing others' norm violations 7 likely to see monetary
payments as commensurable with the gains that gossip gives them.
It is even less plausible that high-status people-those most likely
to be persuasive norm critics-will stop criticizing norms, simply
because they hope that overbroad norms will entrap the unwary and
thus bring these same high-status folk blackmail revenues."8 Here
McAdams also understates the reciprocity that exists among a
group's members. One day's blackmailer may be the next day's
victim. Failing to engage in criticism and refinement of overbroad
norms can entrap many an unwary hypocrite.
To repeat: it is mere speculation that blackmail norms will alter
by legalization to a degree sufficient to make the average person
willing to consider blackmail a real source of revenue. Think, for
example, of whether the legality of the matchmaking business would
lead you to charge two friends a finder's fee (unless matchmaking
were your business) for bringing them together. The mere
introduction of money into the social context is likely to be seen as
an insult.8 9 McAdams overstates when he claims that "[a]nti-
blackmail norms are essentially the same as disclosure norms."4"
Blackmail involves commodification, while disclosure by social
group members usually does not.
James Boyle goes so far as to maintain that commodification is
central to blackmail's criminalization: "[B]lackmail prevents the
commodification of silence about private information partly because
of a romantic notion of privacy, home, and hearth and an associated
belief that we must keep the market away from that realm if we
hope to maintain it[.]"4 1 This is closely connected to a point
McAdams makes, that criminalizing blackmail helps to maintain a
"' McAdams is, of course, quite aware of the role that status competition can play.
See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
' McAdams writes: "The possibility for blackmail creates an expectation of profits
from blackmailing others after discovering their norm violations. The profits create
an opportunity cost to reforming inefficient norms." McAdams, supra note 2, at
2260.
"See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 787.
40 McAdams, supra note 2, at 2284 n.126.
41 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 79 (1996).
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structure where nonmarket norms (of privacy) can dominate. 2 It
is ironic that McAdams fails to take sufficient account of the effect
that antimarket norms can have on behavior.
The antiblackmail norm is likely to be stable after legalization
for yet another reason. Informational blackmail, whether commer-
cial or opportunistic, entails profiting by a norm violation or by
some painful experience that the victim would prefer to conceal. It
is hard to imagine any group that would approve of someone
profiting by means of another's violating the group's own norms.
43
(At least, such approval is hard to imagine short of the special
circumstances and socialization that permits criminal lawyers to view
their tasks as honorable even when defending the guilty.) For this
and related reasons, most people do not consider blackmail among
their options for reasons that appear (to me at least) moral, a matter
of character, and largely unrelated to illegality.
It strikes me as an obvious human trait-a matter of internal
consistency-to have distaste not only for acts that violate one's
norms (whatever the specific norms might be) but also for acts that
profit from that violation, especially if the profit comes from
covering up the violation. Incentives may also help to explain this
trait. Crime annals suggest that would-be blackmailers hone tools
of temptation and entrapment; if so, legalizing blackmail might
increase the incidence of norm violation as people fall into
blackmailers' traps. Another part of the distaste is symbolic:
upholding the underlying norm by frowning on those who profit by
its violation.44 Further, as I have argued elsewhere at some length,
blackmail violates principles of equality through the infliction of an
unjustified injury, and as such is a deontologic wrong. 5 This, too,
42 See McAdams, supra note 2, at 2282-83.
4s Cf Leviticus 19:16 ("Do not profit by the blood of your neighbor."), available in
THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 896 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 1981); Leviticus
19:17 ("Reprove your neighbor, but incur no guilt because of him."), available in THE
TORAH, supra, at 896. Although this translation is only one of many possible variants,
it captures familiar moral sentiments.
" Cf Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2024 (examining "the function of the law in
'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly").
"' This is discussed at length in Gordon, supra note 32, at 1758-75 (arguing that,
from the deontologic perspective, commercial blackmail constitutes an unjustified
intentional infliction of harm for the blackmailer's personal benefit).
In the case of opportunistic blackmail, however, whether the blackmailer causes
injury is contestable. Compare opportunistic blackmail with the commercial
blackmail case, using the definition of harm I have proposed: A transaction is
harmful or injurious if
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is likely to give stability to the antiblackmail social norm even in the
face of blackmail legalization.46 But only empirical investigation
can determine if this supposition is correct.
The realm of norm enforcement is layers more complex than
McAdams's article suggests. His intricate rational choice structure
is built on a paucity of factors that fails to capture the most
important features of how humans make decisions in morally
charged settings.4 7 Also, it is instructive to compare his approach
(1) the thing the seller wants the buyer/victim to purchase is such that the
buyer would be better off, in regard to that thing, if the seller and his
resources did not exist,
(2) the buyer/victim would be better off if the transaction were impossible
and known by all parties to be impossible, and
(3) the buyer/victim has done nothing to the other party that would give
that party a corrective justice right against her.
Id. at 1772 (footnotes omitted).
If selling silence were impossible, the commercial blackmailer would never
have bothered to research the negative information. Thus, the commercial
blackmailer clearly proposes an injurious transaction. By contrast, regard-
ing information accidentally acquired, a victim might indeed be worse off if money-
for-silence transactions were impossible-after all, the opportunistic black-
mailer's acquisition of the information did not depend upon the hope of a blackmail
payment.
*' It is also possible that, instead of eroding antiblackmail norms, legalizing
blackmail will strengthen those norms by increasing the psychic rewards for norm
compliance and the social opprobrium for norm noncompliance. Although this
seems unlikely, consider in this regard the argument Landes and Posner have made
for not imposing a duty to rescue: that moral claims are stronger, and social rewards
like praise are greater, when persons do creditable things beyond what the law requires
them to do. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83, 93-100 (1978) (suggesting that monetary incentives would reduce rather
than increase overall incentives toward heroism).
47 Admittedly, any social science abstracts from reality and eliminates some factors
to concentrate on others. The issue is whether the most useful factors are preserved,
and whether the assumptions that are made about those factors are close enough to
reality to provide useful approximations.
McAdams's transaction-cost analysis is also flawed. Although he is of course
correct in asserting that many affected third parties are not in a position to bargain
with potential blackmailers, he is mistaken in asserting that, in a world without
transaction costs, the market would "solve" the blackmail problem in a way
guaranteed to maximize utility. Compare his treatment with Gordon, supra note 32,
at 1754-57 (discussing the impact of wealth effects when reputation is at issue). To
the extent that someone feels that her good reputation or other characteristic is
"priceless," the more likely it is that the price she would demand to sell the
characteristic will be almost infinite-and thus (assuming the individual is not a
billionaire) will greatly exceed the price she could afford to pay for the characteristic
if the law failed to give her an entitlement to it. See id.
Thus, the so-called wealth effect or "ask/offer phenomenon" can be seen as
expressing an aspect of incommensurability. A similar point is made by Sunstein,
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with work that examines specific and actual small groups, like the
work of Robert Ellickson and Lisa Bernstein. It is exceedingly
difficult to attempt generalizations, as McAdams does, about an
abstract small group.4" But in the process McAdams does bring a
host of useful questions to the fore, and has provided a useful
platform for future research.
A caveat is also in order regarding McAdams's assumption that
the law of blackmail reveals a great deal about the law's general
attitude toward nonlegal norms. Note that although gossip helps in
the enforcement of nonlegal norms, it also helps in the enforcement
of legal rules; rumor often helps to identify the perpetrator of a
crime. Therefore, even if blackmail prohibitions are constructed in
part to induce certain information disclosure via gossip, the
information may be more important for the law's own maintenance
than for the enforcement, articulation, and reformation of nonlegal
norms.
To resolve this question, it would be necessary, inter alia,
to examine the legislative history of the blackmail statutes to see
why they fail to distinguish between those "occasions of ridicule or
shame" that are caused by violations of nonlegal norms and those
that are caused by violations of law. My suspicion is that the
primary explanation lies not with a desire to uphold small
group norms, but rather with administrative convenience, and a
desire to avoid the violence to which blackmail victims might be
prone.
III. AN EXAMPLE
One problem with the McAdams article is the dearth of specific
examples. Let me therefore borrow an example from Levmore. It
can be used to illustrate the actual complexity of the behavior
involved and to examine the plausibility of McAdams's implicit
supra note 24, at 839-40.
"' Focusing on hypothesized generic small groups, as McAdams does, provides
some analytic advantages. Nevertheless, such a generic approach inevitably has its
costs, obscuring for example the differences between Gemeinschaft-like groups (organic
traditional communities and intimate groups like the family) and those that are
Gesellschaft-like (impersonal, arms-length associations such as commercial concerns),
a set of distinctions that played a strong role in early twentieth-century sociology. See
FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (C.P. Loomis ed. & trans., Michigan
State Univ. Press 1957) (originally published as CEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT
(1887)).
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claim that, if blackmail were legalized, the likelihood of blackmail
revenues would be taken into account by all actors.
Levmore describes a situation in which one social guest watches
another social guest slip one of the host's valuable knick-knacks into
a pocket. The watching guest thinks this is probably an act of
theft-undoubtedly a norm violation. His question is, what to do?
Speaking to the host directly might alienate the host, and might
even cast suspicion on the speaker as the person really responsible
for the missing item. Speaking to the full-pocketed guest might
create justified anger-"What do you mean, spying on me? This
knick-knack happens to be something I lent the host last year, which
he left out on the table so I wouldn't forget to take it home with
me-and would certainly create a scene.
It is hard to imagine that this awkward scenario would change
in any way were blackmail legal. What is our protagonist-the
watching guest-concerned with? He is concerned with upholding
norms, protecting feelings, and safeguarding his own standing and
respect among peers. Although rewards are certainly lawful, he is
not thinking of the reward money he could earn by turning in the
other guest. Why would making blackmail lawful make him
consider selling his silence to the pilfering guest?
McAdams makes clear the central point about inalienability: by
forbidding information-holders from exchanging their disclosure-
potential for money, it requires those persons to resolve their
decisions about disclosure according to nonmonetary norms.49 But
I doubt that one needs to outlaw money-for-silence transactions in
order to make this happen. Michael Walzer has suggested that our
social and legal worlds are subdivided into many spheres, and that
within each sphere different criteria govern." An important part
of our childhood social conditioning constitutes training in how to
keep the various spheres separate-so that, for example, we do not
sell our honor for a cookie or for a promise to "be your best
49 See Radin, supra note 17, at 1855. Thus, to the extent society views a certain
good or characteristic as nonfungible, its perceived incommensurability can be
safeguarded by prohibiting its possessor to exchange ihe good for money. (Dollar
bills are, of course, the ultimate in fungibility.) Barred from the market, an individual
will then have to make decisions on the basis of nonmonetary values thought to be
more appropriate. Thus, McAdams usefully points out a blackmail ban can help free
a space for nonmonetary privacy norms to operate.
50 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALrrY (1983). On inalienability and incommensurability, see Radin, supra note
24; Radin, supra note 17; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17; Schauer, supra note 24;
Sunstein, supra note 24.
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friend." McAdams needs to explain why merely making it lawful to
extract blackmail payments, and inserting that fact into Levmore's
guest/host example, would change the nature of the protagonist's
concerns, or our views that money should not be relevant to
friendship. The burden is on McAdams to make this showing if he
wishes to be persuasive: because most of us learn that it is ignoble
to transform social relations into money, after childhood the norm
largely self-polices. Nevertheless, McAdams has usefully begun the
inquiry into whether the legal system assists in this boundary
maintenance.
CONCLUSION
Economists are accustomed to working with narrow sets of
assumptions, with rational actors so minimally described that even
gymnasts might envy the way they are stripped for action. This
methodology, often fruitful precisely because its models' simple
assumptions allow complex results to be derived, depends among
other things on commensurability: that all goods and all values can
be measured by some common yardstick.51 The assumption is that
human rationality can sort all choices by some overriding algorithm.
Yet some choices may be incapable of being so resolved.
52
This is not necessarily a defect in rationality." Even within the
most rational of us, many sources and types of values compete for
our allegiance. 54 But as lawyers we are committed to the public
sphere, and in that sphere decisions must be made and accountabil-
ity assessed. We therefore may be prone to thinking that because
the use of consistent criteria is desirable in principled public deci-
sionmaking, it is necessary to all private decisionmaking as well.55
51 The yardstick utilized by most economists is, of course, "willingness to pay."
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 12 (4th ed. 1992).
52 The worst of these we refer to as "tragic." Bernard Williams defines tragic
choices as those where "an agent can justifiably think that whatever he does will be
wrong." BERNARD WILLIAMS, Conflicts of Value, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 1973-1980, at 71, 74 (1981); see also CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 17, in
whichJudge Calabresi shows the instability of criteria that can result when inevitable
but insupportable choices must be made.
" Williams argues that "it must be a mistake to regard a need to eliminate conflict
as a purely rational demand." WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 81.
54 See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 (1979) (discussing "some
problems created by a disparity between the fragmentation of value and the single-
ness of decision").
5 Williams argues:
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That would be an error, at least if the kind of consistency expected
is of the algorithmic type.
If not all goods and values are commensurable with money, that
suggests that increasing the amount of money attached to a given
behavior will not always generate a significant increase in the
behavior.5" Thus, for example, even if blackmail were lawful, many
persons might be unwilling to trade off their sense of honor for a
chance at blackmail revenues. Of course, some might do so-but the
issue is whether the shift in behavior is likely to occur frequently
enough that the law should take note of it.
What do I mean by claiming that our morality has several, non-
commensurable strains within it? The simplest illustration is,
admittedly, a bit extreme, but for the sake of clarity, let us use it:
the conundrum of the evil deity, famously posed by one Karamazov
brother to another.57 Assume a deity exists that has the power to
free the world from war and all sorts of evil; this deity can bring on
a time of peace, health, and plenty in which no one-least of all chil-
dren-would ever again suffer. But further assume that this deity is
perverse and demands as the price of this world-wide transforma-
tion that you (yes you, personally) torture a designated small child
to death. Would you do it?
Part of you probably feels horrified. To that part of you, it is
paramountly clear that the child is morally entitled to be free of
your torture. Yet you also know that as a result of your reluctance,
other children-hundreds and thousands of children this year, then
[S]ome new accord must be found between private understanding, which
can live with a good deal of 'intuition' and unresolved conflict, and the
public order, which, unless we are to give up the ethical ambition that it be
answerable, can only live with less....
[I]f philosophy is to understand the relations between conflict and
rationalisation in the modern world, it should look towards an equilibrium-
one to be achieved in practice-between private and public.
WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 82.
Arguably, that is the role of liberalism: to allow competing conceptions of the
good to coexist with government. But of course, the relationship among commensu-
rability, commodification, and liberalism is quite contested. Compare, e.g., FREIDRICH
A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 56-71 (1944) with Radin, supra note 17, at 1887.
56 In fact, a growing body of psychological data suggests that extrinsic rewards
such as money can even discourage valuable behaviors, by damping the intrinsic sense
ofsatisfaction that often motivates the best work. Seegenerally ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED
BY REWARDS: THE TROUBLE WITH GOLD STARS, INCENTIVE PLANS, A's, PRAISE, AND
OTHER BRIBES (1993) (summarizing the psychological literature from this perspective).
57 See FYODOR DOsTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 226 (Ralph E. Matlaw
ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1976) (1880).
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millions more children as the years roll by-will suffer as bombs fall,
illnesses spread, and abusive relatives batter. All this pain could be
obviated by one day's horrible act by you. So another part of you
may feel morally obligated to torture the child today in order to
obtain freedom from torture for all children for all time in the
future.5
Ethicists usually use the term "deontologic" to refer to that
component of your moral thinking that will have nothing to do with
causing pain to the child. This part of your moral self sees the
individual child as an end in herself.5 9 A deontologist obeys rules
whose content does not vary with consequences.
60
By contrast, ethicists usually use the term "consequentialist" or
"utilitarian" to refer to that component of your moral thinking that
does care about how many people will be injured. This part of your
moral self cares more about what eventuates than about how an end
is achieved.6 1 It is the consequentialistic component of your moral
thinking that feels obligated to procure the world its universal
happiness even if it means torturing a child and damning your own
self.
6 2
How can a single individual hold such divergent views? One
part of the answer is surely our ability to visualize differing images
sequentially: our allegiance undoubtedly shifts as our mental
attention focuses first on one aspect of the scene (this child), then
on another (my act), and finally on another (the welfare of tomor-
s If you do not yet feel torn, consider the added twists to the conscience posed
byJOHN FOWLES, THE MAGUS 430-35 (rev'd ed. 1977) or by URSULA K. LE GUIN, The
Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, in THE WIND'S TWELVE QUARTERS 224 (1975).
" Similarly, many religious views see "a world in each individual." Note that a
deontologist may care about both the child and the others affected; there can be
incommensurability within a given moral view in addition to the incommensurability
that can result from having allegiance to more than one moral view.
0 This part of your moral self also cares about how things happen: that you do
evil matters as a moral fact in itself. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE
165-88 (1986).
61 See id.
62 In a Borges story, the possibility is raised that the true savior is Judas because
Judas, in order to carry out the prophecy, does something that causes him to be
eternally damned-surely a greater sacrifice than allowing one's self to be crucified.
SeeJORCE Luis BORGES, Three Versions ofJudas, in LABYRINTHS: SELECTED STORIES &
OTHER WRITINGS 95 (Donald A. Yates & James E. Irby eds., 1964). Of course, part
of the paradox here is the puzzle of how a true sacrifice could warrant damnation:
the answers are at least two-that the deity is perverse, as posited in The Brothers
Karamazov, or that there can indeed be situations, as Williams claims, in which there
is nothing one can do which would be right. See supra note 52 (discussing tragic
choices).
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row's generations). I would hardly be the first to suggest that as
humans we define ourselves in part by choosing the one vision we
find most persuasive (or most vivid or most moving) from among
the many narratives within calling distance of our empathy.
As Roger Shattuck notes:
Walt Whitman lived at peace with the fact that he contradicted
himself. He said that he contained multitudes. Proust asks the
next question. How much of his multitudinous self can a person
be or embody at one time? ... No matter how we go about it we
cannot be all of ourselves all at once. Narrow light beams of percep-
tion and of recollection illuminate the present and the past in
vivid fragments.... [T]o summon our entire self into simulta-
neous existence lies beyond our powers. We live by synechdoche,
by cycles of being.
63
Although we may live by synecdoche, we nevertheless try to
make social decisions by some relatively consistent vision, and to
pre-announce shifts in the rules of the game when our public
criteria alter. And, truth be told, I have yet some hope of working
out a guide for my own rocky choices among seemingly incommen-
surable values. But no matter how utilitarian my own personal
algorithm turns out to be, I am sure that in some areas cons'equen-
tialism would not rule.
Social science always involves approximation, and one salutary
effect of studying norms should be to increase our knowledge of
where it is dangerous-even as an assumption-to treat the bulk of
personal decisionmaking as commercially motivated. In realms
where nonmonetary and antimonetary norms play a strong role, it
is not the best use of scholarly energy to assume that a law which
alters .monetary payoffs will necessarily have significant behavioral
effects. In such realms, it is certainly possible that the monetary
changes will alter behavior, but the degree of such impact should be
investigated empirically.
6s ROGER SHATrUCK, MARCEL PROUST 5-6 (1974).

